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Abstract
In lieu of an abstract, below is the essay's first paragraph.
By the spring of 1914, the question of Irish home Rule had been completely transformed into a question
of the coercion of Ulster. The traditional bulwarks of resistance to Home Rule had been effectively
removed by the emasculation of the House of Lords, following their rejection of the " People's Budget" of
1909, and by John Redmond's successful resurrection of the Irish Parliamentary Party from the ashes of
self immolation following Parnell 's meteoric downfall. Protestant Ulster, with the apparent hour of "Rome
rule" drawing nearer, abandoned the advice of moderates and logicians and began to take up arms
against the crown in order to maintain it. Were it not for a wrong tum by the Archduke Franz Ferdinand's
driver in Sarajevo, Englishmen would likely have found themselves talked into a Civil War by a loud
minority of Irishmen.
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1.-ish II omc Rule
by Galen Lewis

By the spring of 1914, the question of
Irish I lome Rule had been completely
transfonned into a question of the coercion
of Ulster.
The traditional bulwarks of
resistance to Home Rule had been
effectively removed by the emasculation of
the House of Lords, following their rejection
of the " People' s Budget" of 1909, and by
John Redmond 's successful resurrection of
the Irish Parliamentary Party from the ashes
of self immolation following Parnell 's
meteoric downfall. Protestant Ul ster, with
the apparent hour of "Rome rule" drawing
nearer, abandoned the advice of moderates
and logicians and began to take up arms
against the crown in order to maintain it.
Were it not for a wrong tum by the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand's driver in
Sarajevo, Englishman would likely have
found themselves talked into a Civil War by
a loud minority of Irishmen.
The situation as it stood in 1914 does
beg a very significant question, that being
why hadn't such bellicose resistance arisen
from Ulster during the two previous Horne
Rule debates? And furthermore, why hadn 't
the previous two bills been transformed to
revolve around Ulster, and not Ireland as a
whole, as the last was destined to? The
answer is not completely clear, as it seems
that perhaps the same resistance did in fact
arise, the difference lying in the two years
the bill (introduced in April of 1912) was
allowed to fester, the Ulstermen to sabrerattle, and Asquith's cabinet hinting of
coercion.
How different was Ulster that it dreaded
Home Rule to such an extent? The three
provinces of Munster, Leinster, and
Connacht were, for the most part, rural, poor
and overwhelmingly Roman Catholic.
Ulster boasted nearly the reverse. Out of a

total populati on of I, 147,000, roughly 8 out
of I 0 were Protestants of various
denominations (890, I 08) (Buckland 16).
The ci ty of Belfast, holding a huge but
proportional sway over the province, was a
tremendous source of pride and wealth to
the Protestant ascendancy and the only city
in Ireland to bear the brunt of the Industrial
Revolution.
The resultant self-identity,
strong, confident and British, was to be a
huge force in the Home Rule debates.
One prominent Unionist attributed
Ulster's success to the fact that she had
"turned her back on rainbow chasing, and
has perseveringly trodden the hard , rough,
path of constant attention to work, low
living and strenuous effort, with the careful
husbanding of the money that was the
reward" (Buckland 30). This melancholy
Protestant ethos was believed to be
unintelligible to the province's Catholic
minority who were thought suited for little
more than soldiery or servitude, and then
only assuming that they had stem discipline
looming menacingly over them. Protestants
acted, for the most part, courteous and civil
toward their Catholic neighbors, but were
horrified at the thought of them acting in
numbers, either physically or politically.
Like their notions of superiority, Protestant
fears were rooted in history. The Orange
Order drank to "The glorious, pious and
immortal memory of the great and good
King William, who saved us from popery,
slavery, knavery, brass money and wooden
1
shoes" and the Revolt of 1641 was cited as
further proof of Catholic treachery. Society
was indeed fractured (Buckland 22).
1

The references o f wooden shoes being to the
French, although this is quite ironic in that we now
tend to associate wooden shoes with the state o f
William's birth, Holland.
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Prosperity in Ulster
y, genera ll
and
Belfast
y, specifi call was seen solel y as a
result of the Act of Union. In the words o f
a Belfast
on delegati meeting with Gladstone
in 1893:

birthplace o f the inqui sition, found itself
able to govern without the aid o f His
Hol iness. As if the dark shadow of Rome in
general wasn't frightening enough to a large
segment of the community, most assumed
that the church would sink its claws into the
yo ung under a mandatory apparatus of
Catholic education, or worse yet, Protestants
would be excluded from government
resulting in their being reduced to "hewers
of wood and drawers of water for their
Catholic masters" (Buck land 32). Certain
contemporary events did not help Irish
Catholics to shake this image, namely
church involvement in Parnell's spectacular
fall and the ill-timed Ne Tempere decree of
1908; however, Protestant fears of Rome
were, in hindsight, obviously a vestigial
legacy of a bygone era (Buckland 30-32).
The second line of resistance followed
economic reasoning based on a shaky
foundation of Protestant superiority. The
province's leading businessmen, Protestant
nearly as a rule, believed that a parliament
primarily hailing from a rural environment
would be incapable of understanding
Ulster's economy, global and urban. Many
feared the erection of huge protective tariffs
in an attempt at self-sufficiency coupled
with some backhanded Tammany Hall style
of government that would see them all
ruined. These fears resulted in an economic
panic in Belfast when Gladstone's first
Home Rule bill was announced in J886 and
is further evidenced by Lord Pirrie's
decision to move the whole of Harland &
Wolffs operations to the Clyde in the event
that Home Rule passed (Bardon 404).
As Protestant Ulster stewed in
sectarian fear, the Irish mandate for Home
rule grew, and grew quickly.
Charles
Parnell 's Land League apparatus had been
turned into a powerful force at Westminster
and by 1885 nearly 80% of the country
supported Home Rule. The Irish mandate
found a receptive ear in William Gladstone.

All our progress has been made under
We were a small
,
the union.
insignificant town at the end of the last
century, deeply di saffected and hostile to
the British Empire. Since the Union and
under equal Jaws, we have been wedded
to the Empire and made progress second
to none (Buckland 30).

Jt was common for Ulstermen to point to
the Act of Union as a simple answer for
what was, in rea lity, the complex result of a
series of mostl y global economic factors.
The real reasons for Protestant U lster's
affection for Union and resistance to Home
Rule were probably more in line with the
opinion of a Derry doctor, who believed that
Ulster was "prosperous, content and happy,
and why she should be afraid to take a blind
leap into the dark is easy to understand"
(Buckland 30).
The "dark" was rule by a Dublin, and
parliament.
overwhelmingly
Catholi c,
There were two main thrusts to arguments of
resistance to Horne Rule, the evi ls of Popery
and the evi ls of southern economics. Many
Protestants at the tum of the last century,
and not just in U lster, believed that the Pope
was intent on once again wielding power
over the entire globe. This 17th century
mindset fostered a legitimate fear of the
Papacy.
Jonathon Bardon writes that
"Catholicism was regarded as an oppressive
and backward religion and the fear that
Home Rule would result in Rome rule was
genuine" (Bardon 407). It seemed to occur
to few that the Trish parliament would act
independently of Rome as did the
governments of nearly every other modern
Catholic nation at the time, for even Spain,
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The "Grand Old Man" of British politics,
Gladstone picked up the standard of Irish
If omc Ruic towards the end of the election
campaign of l 885, drawing cri ti ci sm and
accusations of ill motive from all -sides. His
motives were, and are, heavily debated. He
likely felt that Britain owed a debt to the
people of Ireland and that certainly fits in
with his actions regarding the Balkans,
where he championed nationalism and an
anti-imperialist mindset. It is also likely that
the balance of power in parli ament, held by
the Irish Nationalists, figured prominently
into his decision, as did the chance to finally
remove the problems of governi ng Ireland
from the halls of Westminster. Regardless
of his reasons, the result was an angry Ulster
and the staunch opposition of the
Conservative Party, strengthened by many
defectors from Gladstone 's own benches.
When introducing the Home Rule
Bill on April 8, J 886, Gladstone stated that
he could not "allow it to be said that a
Protestant minority in Ulster, or elsewhere,
is to rule the question at large for
lreland ... but 1 think that the Protestant
minority should have its wished considered
to the utmost practicable extent in any form
they may assume" (Stewart 2 1). That would
not be good enough for Ulster, the question
was, would she find a collective and
representative voice to say so.
The Ulster of 1885 was seriously split
along party lines, resulting in many
Nationalist gains in the general election.
Liberal
and
Conservative
Unionists
contested seats that went to Pamellites on
E lection Day. With Home Rule at the fore
of British politics following Gladstone's
election, it was realized by many that it
could never be successfully resisted by
anything but a solid Protestant political bloc,
arranged not along traditional party lines,
but by a desire to preserve the Union. From
the outset, these measures bore a
distinctively regional , that is to say mainly

limited to Ul ster, appearance. The Ulster
Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union (ULARU),
predominantly Conservati ve, also drew in
the Orange Order, revived by Colonel
Edward Saunderson in 1883, and quickly
became the most vocal cross-party body, the
Order having proven incapable of uniting
Unionists on its own as a result of its violent
rhetoric and penchant for hurling paving
stones.
The Anti-Repeal Union focused its
efforts on lobbying Westminster and
consolidating Unionist power in Ulster, but
also devoted a fairly large portion of its time
to spouting alanning rhetoric and extrapolitical organization. At a 20,000-man
rally on April 26, 1886 it was declared that
if Home Rule was granted, "We shall not
government;
that
acknowledge
that
we ... will refuse to pay taxes imposed by it;
and ... that we will resist to the utmost all
attempts to enforce such payments"
(Buckland 2). The ULARU found its most
vocal and powerful supporter in Lord
Randolph Churchi ll , then at the height of his
power and considered
an eventual
Churchill,
Conservative Prime Minister.
having early on decided "that if the G.O.M.
went for Home Rule, the Orange Card
would be the one to play" and praying that it
tuned out to be "the ace of trumps and not
the two" accepted an invitation from the
ULARU to speak at Belfast's Ulster Hall in
February of 1886 (Buckland 9).
After
warning the province to prepare so that
Home Rule would not come upon them "like
a thief in the night," his words became a
harbinger of a future crisis: "I do not hesitate
to say .. .in that dark hour there will not be
wanting to you those of position and
influence in England who are willing to cast
in their lot with you, whatever it may be,
and who will share your fortune and fate"
(Stewart 22). Churchill went on to say in a
public letter a few days later:
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If pol iti cal parties and political leaders
shou ld be so utterly lost to every feeling
and dictate of honour and courage to
hand over coldly ... the li ves and libert ies
of the loyalists of Ulster to their
hereditary and most bitter foes, make no
doubt o n this point; Ulster at the pro per
moment will resort to the supreme
arbitrate of fo rce; Ulster will fi ght, and
Ulster will be right (Stewart 23).

separating the two was time. The di vision
fo r the First Home Rule Bi ll occurred on
June 8, 1886, the debate had been in the fore
a mere two months. By the time the Great
War intervened in 19 14 Home rule had
occupied the politicians, and the nation, for
near! y two and a half years.
Despite an eloquent and providential
plea by Gladstone, in which he ex horted
Parliament to "think well , think wisely,
think no t for the moment but for the years
which are to come, before you reject this
bill" (Stewart 23), the First Home Ruic Bill
was defeated by thirty votes, 93 Liberals
having voted aga inst their own leader. The
Conservative Party rejoiced as did the
rio ting loyalists of Belfast, who had been
read the Riot Act fou r days previous a fler
having run every Catholic out of the Lagan
shipyards and continued on in sectarian
fervor to bum their homes. The city was in
a state of anarchy with mob violence
erupting in every section of the city where
Catholics and Protestants fou nd one another
in proximity. The riots continued for four
more days before they were suppressed,
only to erupt anew a month later (Bardon
380-2). It must have seemed unli kely to
many o n the English side of the Irish Sea
that such people were even worthy of selfgovemment.
Ulster Unionism did not immediately
subside following the defeat of Home Rule
as many assumed it would. The autumn
election of 1886 saw a Unionist candidate
retake the Derry seat Jost to the Natio nalists
a year prior; the balance of Ulster was o nce
again U nionist, 17 scats to the Nationalist 's
16. Unionist clubs were functioning well at
the grassroots, constituency level despite the
loose ties that bound them to the central
Unionist Club Council. Under the auspices
of these clubs, U nionists did not o ppose one
another, ending the fratricidal sapping of
strength that had plagued them in prior
contests. By 1890 the Grand Old Man had

The saying was to long outl ive Lord
Randolph Churchill ; people are still dying
for it in Northern Ireland today. The speech
was to put in the nation's mind the spectre
of arm ed Ulster resistance, a spectre whose
features would become clearer with each
passing year.
The method by w hich Ulster planned to
resist " the thief in the night" was a 60,000
man volunteer force, formed into two fu ll
army corps by the end of May. Just as was
to be the case in 19 12-1
9 14,
prominent army
offi cers had pl edged their suppo rt and the
Fourth Sea Lord had stated that he would
resign fro m the Admira lty before he would
enforce Home Rule. Non-commissioned
offi cers were solicited to begin drilling the
King's men (Buckland 12). Before the
divisio n on the first Ho me Rule bill, the MP
for West Belfast stated that " there can be no
doubt that the Loyalists are arming," and it
seem s that the movement was no t limited to
the sections of society that historicall y had a
certain appreciation for anything involving
guns, loud explosio ns, and dead people
(Bardon 382). Quite on the contrary, "The
wo rd ' Resist! Resist! ' was on the lips not
merely of Orangem en, but of Liberals, of
those w ho by their pro fession were men of
peace, merchants, manu facturers, bankers,
medical men, and even clergymen" (Bardon
383). Just like the C risis surrounding the
third Home Rule bill, a huge cross section of
society was at least tacitly in suppo rt of
armed resistance.
The vital difference
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recently evicted P rime Min ister, Lo rd
Salisbury, deli vered a benediction o r
Unio
stni acti on. 1le spo ke to the effect that
in the past Ulster had resisted the
unconstitutional acti ons o r James 11 and
today could be counted on to resist the
unconstitutional actio ns of a treacherous
parliament, for he did not think that " the
people of Ulster had lost their sturdy love of
freedo m no r their detestation of ar bitrary
power" (Buckland 15).
Arthur Bal fo ur
spoke more menacingly: "U lster can at all
events fi ght; the last refuge of brave men
struggling for their freedom cannot be
denied them" (Buckland 18).
As in 1886 talk of resistance was not
merely limited to words. In March of 1893
the Ulster Defence Council was formed
under the auspices o f the Unionist Club
Council; its executive consisted of the
province 's parli amenta rians. Once again old
soldiers were lined up to take charge of the
group and feelers were put out to foreign
anns
manufacturers.
Once
again
preparations were made for U lster's armed
resistance to Home rule, and once again time
would keep the spectre at bay.
Vocal support for Ho me Rule was much
harder to come by, apart from that which
sprang from the mouth from Gladsto ne
himself. His passion w as not shared by
many of his fellow Liberals and the efforts
of Nationalists were still hamstrung by their
very publi c schism .
Despite the
inauspicious omens, sheer numbers carried
Ho me Rule across the floor of the Commons
in the summer of 1893; no other 19th
Century bill had occupied as much of the
House 's time (Bardon 41 ). The measure,
however, would find a far less receptive
audience in the staunchly Conservative
House of Lords.
The bill was defeated by the Lords on
Sept
e ermb 9, 1893 by 378 votes. Only two
members were absent without legitimate
excuse and even the infirm had been

entered hi s eightieth decade, hardly the
image o f man w ith fi ght le ft in him. The
Iri sh Parli amentary Party had nearly sclfdestructed following Pam ell 's public fall.
The Natio nalists that sat in Westminster
were hardly an inspiratio n for Home Rule.
It mi ght have seemed likely that the Irish
sto rm had passed (Bardon 408).
The electio n o f 1892 proved that the
sto rm had merely blown o ut to sea for six
years. G ladstone once again sat on the
Treasury Bench and was once again
dependent on the Nationalist vote, albeit
now fractured between anti-Pamellites and
adherents of the dead man. Once again the
Unioni st apparatus sprung into action at all
levels, with the central Club Council taking
o n an ever more important role in the mold
of the ULAR U in 1886.
In June, 1892, resistance was centered
o n Belfast, the site of an immense Unionist
rally. Under the largest tent in Ireland the
sons of U lster spoke to their resolve
surrounded by miles of bunting and
hundreds of Union Jacks. A fter the keyno te
speaker, the Duke of Albereon, appealed to
the "men of the north" to resist, Liberal MP
Thomas Sinclair raised more a pplause by
stating :
Fellow countrymen, Mr. Gladstone's
threat is a serio us o ne, but, nevertheless,
we can never falter in our resolve. We
are the children of the Revo lution of
1688, and, cost what it may, we will
have nothing to do with a Dublin
parliament. If it be ever set up we shall
simply igno re its existence. Its acts will
be but waste paper; the police will find
our barracks pre-occupied with o ur own
constabulary; its judges will sit in empty
court-houses (Buckland 16).
Sinclair's tone was mo re restrained than
that of his colleagues in Britain. At the
annual meeting of the Primrose League, the
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wheeled in to pass through the "nay" door.
Bardon cites the fact that no constitutional
crisis resulted from a plain challenge to the
representatives of the people, as ample
evidence that the bill had little support
among Britons in general. ln fact, it seemed
most were glad lo sec the Iri sh question
di sappear and a return to the normal party
squabbles, familiar to all and threatening to
few. The exceptions were quite obviously
Gladstone, who handed Queen Victoria his
resignation, and the Nationalists, who
couldn't muster the strength to yell over one
another to coherently argue the fact (Bardon
413).
More so even than in 1886, Home Rule
seemed utterly vanquished. When writing
of his father's career in I 904, Winston
Churchill
described
reading
the
parliamentary debates of the subject was like
walking over a long deserted battlefield, the
issues, and even the armies, having been
obscured by time. Churchill need only to
have looked to Ulster to clear his vision.
The Unionist movement did not disappear
with the "cold storage" of Home Rule. It
had little reason to:
"The impressive
commercial and industrial strength of Ulster,
especially in and around Belfast, as the
Victorian Age was succeeded by the
Edwardian,
provided
Unionists
with
formidable powers of resistance when Home
Rule once more became the central issue at
Westminster" (Bardon 384).
Ulster's Unionists would not have
needed to be reminded of this by Mr.
Bardon. They were well aware of the power
of their position after successfully contesting
Home Rule twice, and were determined not
to drop their guard, even after Home Rule
had been long eclipsed by the Boer War,
free trade, and constitutional reform.
The Conservative policy of killing Home
Rule with kindness was met with little
support from Ulster's Unionist community.
Partly a result of institutional distrust of

Catholics and equally a product of Ulster's
status as the last bastion of Protestant
landl ordism, growing apprehension was
evident in Unionist ranks. Irish policy once
again was spurred by Ireland' s most vocal
minority after the MacDonnell affair was
"discovered" by the press.
Lord
MacDonnell
was
the
Catholic
Undersecretary of State for Ireland. His
leanings were avowedly nationalistic and he
was a member of the Irish Reform
Association, a group dedicated to the
achievement of Home Rule in Ireland. In
September 1904, the Reform Association
published a scheme to form an Irish national
council that would have some powers of
devolutionary government.
MacDonnell
publicly endorsed the scheme without the
approval of the Conservative government or
his immediate superior, George Wyndham.
A deafening uproar was emitted by Ulster's
Unionists, who cited the plan as a half-baked
and backhanded attempt to grant Ireland
Home Rule on the sly. Unionism was
seldom held back by logic and this time
would be no exception. They were only
placated by the removal of Wyndham, the
man responsible for the final eradication of
the Irish land problem by his Land Act of
1903.
Apart from reminding the
Westminster that they still held sway over
many powerful men, Ulster reminded itself
of the threat, in any form, of Home Rule.
The controversy spurred a reform of the
club council system into a more efficient
and centralized body. The Ulster Unionist
Council (UUC) was formed in March 1905
and from its inception was the model for the
gathering of Unionist support.
It
incorporated
a
fixed
number
of
representatives of the Orange Order,
officials of every grassroots county club, as
well as all of Ulster's Unionist MP's and
Lords. By 1910 a secret committee of the
UUC was meeting to determine its plans to
import arms and a Major Fred Crawford,
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"simply ignores its existence."
The
difference between resistance to the Third
Bill and those previous lay not in an absence
of an Ulster dimension before l 9 12, as that
is what drove the defeat of Home Rule far
more than "the preservation of the empire"
or any other argument against a quasiindependent Ireland, but in the fact that
Home Rule was certain to pass by 19 14.
The Ulstermen felt forced to throw down
their pens and pick up their rifles, as they
would have done, and prepared to do, both
in 1886 and J 893.

who had founded Young Ulster in 1892, was
formally charged with that duty (Bardon
431).
It is Bardon's belief that "Despite
occasional dark threats of popular resistance,
since J 886 the Ulster Unionists had put their
faith in parliamentary action. Now- still
uncertain of the Tory resolve at Westminster
and disgusted by the apparent indifference
of the British electorate-- Northern Loyalist
leaders
firmly
embarked
on
an
unconstitutional course" (Bardon 431 ). By
this reasoning Home Rule would not acquire
a real and dangerous Ulster dimension until
the introduction of the Third Bill in April,
1912. But did not the Loyalist leaders
pursue both courses every step of the way,
abandoning their rifles only when the battle
had been safely won in Parliament? It
seems certain that segments of Ulster society
would have resisted violently to the
imposition of Home Rule. An Orangeman
represented by a Catholic parliament is a
hard sell today, and would have been
ludicrous a century ago. It seems likely that
the resistance would grow among all
members of Protestant society as that
parliament, in conjunction with the British
government, attempted to impose itself on a
province that in Thomas Sinclair's words
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